Committees are often made up of representatives of different-sized groups of individuals, and make decisions by means of a voting rule which specifies what vote configurations can pass a decision. This raises the question of the choice of the optimal voting rule, given the different sizes of the groups that members represent. In this paper we take a new departure to address this problem, assuming that the committee is a bargaining scenario in which negotiations take place 'in the shadow of the voting rule' in search of unanimous consensus. That is, a general agreement is looked for, but any winning coalition can enforce an agreement.
introduction
Committees are often made up of representatives of different-sized groups of individuals, and make decisions by means of a voting rule (often a weighted majority rule, but more generally any arbitrary voting rule) which specifies what vote configurations can pass a decision. Examples of committees of representatives of this type are provided by the councils ruling different kinds of organizations, including important political examples such as the Council of Ministers in the EU. This raises the question of the 'fair', 'optimal' or most adequate voting rule, given the different sizes of the groups that members represent, if a principle of equal representation is to be implemented. This issue has been approached so far by different authors by modelling the decision-making process as an idealized two-stage process, and assessing the 'decisiveness' (i.e., the probability of being crucial or pivotal) in making a decision that can be imputed to each individual in the different groups assuming that each representative follows the majority opinion in his/her 'constituency'. This allows for an assessment of the 'fairness' of the voting rule of the committee (see, e.g., Penrose (1946) , Owen (1975) , Laruelle and Widgrén (1998) , Felsenthal and Machover (1998)) 1 .
Based either on the assessment of the likelihood of being 'decisive' or of being 'satisfied' or 'successful' (Rae (1969) , Brams and Lake (1978) , Barry (1980) , Straffin, Davis, and Brams (1981) , see also Laruelle and Valenciano (2005a) , and, in a different framework, Barberà and Jackson (2004) ), this approach makes sense in the case of a 'take-it-or-leaveit' committee. That is, a committee only entitled to accept or reject proposals submitted to it by some external agency.
In this paper we take a new departure to address the question of the optimal voting rule in a committee of representatives. We assume that the committee is a bargaining scenario in which negotiations take place 'in the shadow of' a voting rule. In the cooperative game theoretic literature on bargaining since Nash's (1950) seminal paper, bargaining is supposed 'by definition' to be a process that can be settled only by unanimity. Asymmetry between players' bargaining powers can only arise from the bargaining environment. In many contexts it is often the case in a committee which uses a (possibly nonsymmetric) voting rule to make decisions that the final vote is merely the formal settlement of a bargaining process in which the issue to be voted upon has been adjusted to gain the acceptance of all members. We base our approach on Laruelle and Valenciano (2005b) , where the following question is addressed: What agreements can a rational agent expect to arise when faced with the prospect of engaging in such a situation? That is, when a general agreement is looked for, but any winning coalition can enforce a (possibly non unanimous) agreement. Based on this answer, and assuming that a principle of equal 1 See Garrett and Tsebelis (1999) for a critique of this approach.
representation is to be implemented, here we answer this question: What is the optimal voting rule in a bargaining committee of representatives of different-sized groups?
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we introduce some basic notation and briefly review the theoretical results that are required. In Section 3 we address the issue of the optimal voting rule in a bargaining committee of representatives. Section 4 examines some related work. Section 5 concludes by recapitulating the foundations of the recommendation implicit in the main result of the paper and pointing out some of its limitations and the main lines of further research.
a bargaining committee
The first element in a bargaining committee is the voting rule. The set N = {1, ..., n} labels the seats on the committee. As only yes/no voting is considered, a vote configuration can be represented by the set of 'yes'-voters. So, any S ⊆ N represents the result of a vote in which only the members of the committee occupying seats in S voted 'yes'. An N -voting rule is specified by a set W ⊆ 2 N of winning (i.e., which would lead to passing a decision) vote configurations such that (i) N ∈ W ; (ii) ∅ / ∈ W ; (iii) If S ∈ W , then T ∈ W for any T containing S; and (iv) If S ∈ W then N\S / ∈ W . W denotes the set of all such N -voting rules.
The n members or players of a committee which uses an N -voting rule are labelled by the seats in N that they occupy, and we refer to the subset of players denoted by S ⊆ N as coalition S. We assume that a committee of n (N -labelled) members makes decisions by means of an N -voting rule W in the following sense. They can reach any alternative within a set A, as well as any lottery over them, as long as: (i) a winning coalition supports it, and
(ii) no player is imposed upon an agreement worse than the status quo, where all players will remain if no winning coalition supports any agreement. It is also assumed that every player has expected utility (von Neumann and Morgenstern, 1944) (vNM) preferences, so that the relevant information concerning the players' preferences can be encodedà la Nash Thus, consistently with the interpretation that accompanied its introduction, any pair (B, W ) ∈ B × W will be referred to as an N -bargaining committee (B, W ) 2 .
2 Classical bargaining problems and simple transferable utility (TU) games can be seen as particular 
for some ϕ : W → R N that satisfies efficiency, anonymity and null player.
Where Nash w (B) denotes the w-weighted asymmetric Nash bargaining solution (Kalai, 1977 ) of an n-person (pure) bargaining problem B = (D, d), for a vector of nonnegative weights w = (w i ) i∈N , given by
with J = {i ∈ N : w i > 0}. The 'weights' are usually interpreted as the 'bargaining power' of the players (see, e.g., Binmore (1998 Binmore ( , 2005 ). Classical Nash's (1950) solution to the bargaining problem corresponds to the case of equal weight for all players. That is,
Therefore, any map ϕ : W → R N that satisfies efficiency, anonymity and null player would fit into formula (1) and yield a solution Φ(B, W ) that satisfies the five rationality conditions. Although the main conclusions of this paper are presented in section 3 for any such map ϕ, a special case is worth distinguishing. By adding the condition of Transfer (T) (Dubey, 1975 ) the same authors prove the following: B × W → R N that satisfies Eff, An, IIA, IAT, NP and T, and it is given by
cases of this model. The n-person classical bargaining problem corresponds to the case of a committee bargaining under the unanimity rule, that is W = {N}.
Where Sh(W ) denotes the Shapley-Shubik (1954) index of the rule W , given by
Formulae (1) and (3) have a clear interpretation. As Binmore points out, the asymmetric Nash solutions can be justified as reflecting the different 'bargaining power' of the players "determined by the strategic advantages conferred on players by the circumstances under which they bargain" (1998, p. 78). In the case of this model of a bargaining committee the voting rule, possibly nonsymmetric, is the only source of differences in 'strategic advantages'. Thus, according to formulae (1) and (3), under the conditions assumed in either case, either vector ϕ(W ) or Sh(W ) gives the 'bargaining power' that the voting rule confers to each member of the committee.
a bargaining committee of representatives
Assume that each member i of a committee of n members, labelled by N , represents a group M i of size m i . If these groups are disjoint and M = ∪ i∈N M i , the cardinal of
., M n }. And assume that it is a bargaining committee in the sense considered in the previous section.
It seems clear that if the different groups are of different sizes a symmetric voting rule is not adequate for such committee, at least if a principle of equal representation is to be implemented. This raises the issue of the choice of the 'most adequate' voting rule under these conditions. The first and main job towards providing an answer is a precise specification of what is meant by 'adequate', 'fair', 'right', or, the term we have chosen here, 'optimal'. 'Optimal' in what sense and from which or whose point of view? The basic idea, which we further specify presently, is this: a voting rule is 'optimal' if any individual of any group is indifferent between bargaining directly and leaving it in the hands of a representative. Utopian as it may sound (and as it is in general), we will show that this is implementable if a certain level of symmetry (not uniformity!) of preferences within every group is assumed.
In general a bargaining committee of representatives will negotiate different issues over time under the same voting rule. In every case, depending on the particular issue, a different configuration of preferences will emerge in the population represented by the members of the committee. Thus it does not make sense to make the 'optimal' voting rule dependent on the preference profile, nor does it make sense to assume unanimous preferences within every constituency. On the other hand, if there is no relationship at all between the preferences of the members within each group it is not clear on what normative grounds to found the choice of a voting rule for the committee of representatives. In order to found an answer we assume that the configuration of preferences in the population represented is symmetric within each group in the following sense. of utility of the other constituencies has been settled. We have that, for all i ∈ N and 
then this rule would exactly implement such environment. In particular, if the index is the Shapley-Shubik index (Theorem 2), an optimal voting rule would be one for which
Then, interpreting the term 'bargaining power' in the precise game-theoretic sense formerly specified, the above discussion can be summarized in the following
Theorem 3
The optimal voting rule in a bargaining committee of representatives is one that gives each member a bargaining power proportional to the size of the group he/she represents.
From the point of view of applications there are still some issues. There is the question of the 'right' power index (i.e., the right ϕ(W )) for assessing the bargaining power that the voting rule confers to each member of the committee. This issue is not settled but, Also, in general, whatever the ϕ, no rule will yield exactly the required bargaining weights.
Thus there is the technical problem of finding the voting rule closest to optimality 5 . There may also be a problem of multiplicity. For instance, if all the groups are of equal size any symmetric voting rule would be optimal according to Theorem 3. In a case such as this there is at least a second point of view to refine the choice: The ease of decision-making (Coleman (1971) , Felsenthal and Machover (1998) ).
In spite of these practical problems, we think it is worth stressing the clear message of Theorem 3, consistent with intuition and different from previous recommendations.
related work
The answer provided by Theorem 3 to the optimal voting rule issue is a completely new departure from previous ones, but it is worth noting the formal similarity with some of them. First, with the naive proposal of a weighted majority rule with weights proportional to the size of the groups, which has long been criticized but is sometimes still used 6 .
Also, in the 'take-it-or-leave-it' scenario, the two-stage idealization yields the 'square root' "But suppose players 2 and 3 decide to act as one player and agree that they will split equally the joint payoff that they obtain this way. Then the game will become a twoperson game between coalition {2, 3} and player 1. Hence each side will obtain a payoff Finally there is the relevant work of Baron and Ferejohn (1989) . In particular their distinction between 'closed' and 'open' amendment rules in a legislature, parallels our distinction between a 'take-it-or-leave-it' committee and a bargaining committee in a different framework. But their analysis is non cooperative and has a descriptive/predictive purpose, while here we adopt a normative approach, cooperatively founded, in search of an answer to the question of the choice of voting rule. On the other hand, their analysis is constrained to the majority rule, and the case of a transferable utility configuration of preferences, while we use a more general setting: non necessarily symmetric voting rules, and non transferable utility preference profiles.
conclusions
From the point of view of voting power theory and collective decision or 'constitutional' design, this paper contributes to some clarification. Namely, an alternative to the traditional a priori voting power approach to the issue of the optimal voting rule, only adequate for what we call a 'take-it-or-leave-it' committee, has been provided. A new approach consistent with the idea of a bargaining committee is the main contribution of this paper.
In real world situations things may most often not be that black-and-white. Often the same committee acts at some times as a 'take-it-or-leave-it' committee, and at others as a bargaining committee. In any case the two clear-cut extreme cases are valuable terms of reference as benchmarks for more complex ones.
Let us examine critically the meaning and foundations of the normative recommendation for a pure bargaining committee implicit in Theorem 3 and point out some lines of further research. The cornerstones of Theorem 3 are, basically, Theorem 1 and a principle of equal representation implementable under certain conditions on the voters preferences.
On the one hand, the classical Nash bargaining solution can be interpreted in positive terms as a prediction of the outcome of negotiations among ideally rational players in a perfectly transparent or complete information environment (e.g., Binmore (2005)) 9 . While such an interpretation may be plausible for the case of two bargainers, it is not that credible for a larger number. In some cases a committee represents thousands or even millions of individuals (consider, e.g., the Council of Ministers of the EU). In such cases 'direct bargaining' is unthinkable in practical terms, but the Nash solution can still be used as an ideal term of reference for normative purposes. The same applies to its extension given by Theorem 1, which is at the base of Theorem 3. Theorem 1 is supported by rather general 'axioms' interpretable as ideal rationality conditions in a complete information environment in the same spirit as Nash's seminal paper.
No doubt it would be desirable to complement the cooperative/axiomatic foundation with a non cooperative analysis. As Binmore, (2005) puts it: "Cooperative game theory sometimes provides simple characterizations of what agreement rational players will reach." This is exactly what Theorem 1 provides for the situation specified. But this is not the end of the story. As the second part of the sentence just quoted goes "but we need noncooperative game theory to understand why." This points out the main line for further research. In fact Theorem 1 (and as a consequence Theorem 3) does not provide a single answer to the question raised. But we see no drawback here. It is our conjecture that a non cooperative model of a bargaining committee will support the results given by Theorems 1 and 3, and account for the different answers implicit in both depending on the specification of the bargaining protocol. In particular we expect the particular answer associated with the Shapley-Shubik index and Theorem 2 to appear as a special case with at the least one 'focal point' character within a range of bargaining protocols.
At the foundations of Theorem 3 an egalitarian principle of equal representation has also been assumed. This justifies the desideratum of a voting rule for the committee such that all people represented see as indifferent direct bargaining (ideal and unfeasible) and leaving it in the hands of a committee of representatives. This in general is obviously utopian, but it has been proved implementable at least under some ideal symmetry conditions. In real world situations this condition may well fail to occur in most cases. Only in the ideal case of M-symmetry is the principle of equal representation sufficient to determine an answer. But this idealization seems a reasonable term of reference if a voting rule is to be chosen 10 .
